Random self-reducibility of ideal-svp via arakelov random walks by Boer, K. (Koen) de et al.
Random Self-reducibility of Ideal-SVP
via Arakelov Random Walks
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Abstract. Fixing a number field, the space of all ideal lattices, up to isom-
etry, is naturally an abelian group, called the Arakelov class group. This
fact, well known to number theorists, has so far not been explicitly used
in the literature on lattice-based cryptography. Remarkably, the Arakelov
class group is a combination of two groups that have already led to signif-
icant cryptanalytic advances: the class group and the unit torus.
In the present article, we show that the Arakelov class group has more
to offer. We start with the development of a new versatile tool: we prove
that, subject to the Riemann Hypothesis for Hecke L-functions, certain
random walks on the Arakelov class group have a rapid mixing property.
We then exploit this result to relate the average-case and the worst-case
of the Shortest Vector Problem in ideal lattices. Our reduction appears
particularly sharp: for Hermite-SVP in ideal lattices of certain cyclotomic
number fields, it loses no more than a Õ(
√
n) factor on the Hermite
approximation factor.
Furthermore, we suggest that this rapid-mixing theorem should find
other applications in cryptography and in algorithmic number theory.
1 Introduction
The task of finding short vectors in Euclidean lattices (a.k.a. the approximate
Shortest Vector Problem) is a hard problem playing a central role in complexity
theory. It is presumed to be hard even for quantum algorithms, and thanks
to the average-case to worst-case reductions of Ajtai [1] and Regev [40], it has
become the theoretical foundation for many kinds of cryptographic schemes.
Furthermore, these problems appear to have resisted the quantum-cryptanalytic
efforts so far; the overlying cryptosystems are therefore deemed quantum-safe,
and for this reason are currently being considered for standardization.
Instantiations of these problems over ideal lattices have attracted particular
attention, as they allow very efficient implementations. The Ring-SIS [28,30,38]
and Ring-LWE [29,43] problems were introduced, and shown to reduce to worst-
case instances of Ideal-SVP (the specialization of approx-SVP to ideal lattices).
In this work, we propose to recast algebraic lattice problems in their natural
mathematical abstraction. It is well known to number theorists (e.g. [41]) that
c© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2020
D. Micciancio and T. Ristenpart (Eds.): CRYPTO 2020, LNCS 12171, pp. 243–273, 2020.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56880-1_9
244 K. de Boer et al.
the space of all ideal lattices (up to isometry) in a given number field is naturally
an abelian group, called the Arakelov class group. Yet, this notion has never
appeared explicitly in the literature on lattice-based cryptography. The relevance
of this perspective is already illustrated by some previous work which implicitly
exploit Arakelov ideals [6,16] and even the Arakelov class group [26,39]. Beyond
its direct result, our work aims at highlighting this powerful formalism for finer
and more rigorous analysis of computational problems in ideal lattices.
1.1 Our Result
The first half of this work (Sect. 3) is dedicated to the development of a
new versatile tool: we prove that, subject to the Riemann Hypothesis for Hecke
L-functions, certain random walks on the Arakelov class group have a rapid
mixing property. In the second half (Sect. 4), we exploit this result to relate the
average-case and the worst-case of Ideal-SVP, due to the interpretation of the
Arakelov class group as the space of all ideal lattices. Note that this reduction
does not directly impact the security of existing schemes: apart from the his-
torical Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme of Gentry [17],1 there exists no
scheme based on the average-case version of Ideal-SVP. The value of our result
lies in the introduction of a new tool, and an illustration of the cryptanalytic
insights it offers.
A second virtue of our technique resides in the strong similarities it shares
with a distant branch of cryptography: cryptography based on elliptic curves [22],
or more generally on abelian varieties [23]. These works established that the
discrete logarithm problem in a randomly chosen elliptic curve is as hard as in
any other in the same isogeny class. The strategy consists in doing a random
isogeny walk, to translate the discrete logarithm problem from a presumably
hard curve to a uniformly random one. The core of this result is a proof that
such walks are rapidly mixing within an isogeny graph (which is isomorphic to
the Cayley graph of the class group of a quadratic number field). As long as the
length of the random walk is polynomial, the reduction is efficient.
We proceed in a very similar way. The set of ideal lattices (up to isometry) of
a given number field K can be identified with the elements of the Arakelov class
group (also known as the degree zero part Pic0K of the Picard Group). There
are two ways to move within this group: given an ideal, one can obtain a new
one by ‘distorting’ it, or by ‘sparsifying’ it. In both cases, finding a short vector
in the target ideal also allows to find a short vector in the source ideal, up to a
certain loss of shortness. This makes the length of the walk even more critical in
our case than in the case of elliptic curves: it does not only affect the running
time, but also the quality of the result.
Nevertheless, this approach leads to a surprisingly tight reduction. In the case
of cyclotomic number fields of conductor m = pk, under the Riemann Hypothesis
for Hecke L-functions (which we abbreviate ERH for the Extended Riemann
1 We here refer to the full fledge version of the scheme from Gentry’s PhD Thesis, which
differs from the scheme in [18], the latter having been broken already [6,10,11,16].
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Hypothesis), and a mild assumption on the structure of the class groups, the
loss of approximation factor is as small as ˜O(
√
m). In other words:
Main Theorem (informal). Let m = pk be a prime power. If there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm for solving Hermite-SVP with approximation factor γ
over random ideal lattices of Q(ζm), then there also exists a polynomial time
algorithm that solves Hermite-SVP in any ideal lattice with approximation factor
γ′ = γ · √m · poly(log m).
In fact, this theorem generalizes to all number fields, but the loss in approx-
imation factor needs to be expressed in more involved quantities. The precise
statement is the object of Theorem 4.5.
Prerequisites. The authors are aware that the theory of Arakelov class groups,
at the core of the present article, may not be familiar to all readers. Given space
constraints, some definitions or concepts are introduced very briefly. We found
Chapters I and VII of Neukirch’s textbook [36] to be a good primer.
1.2 Overview
The Arakelov class group. Both the unit group [11] and the class group [12] have
been shown to play a key role in the cryptanalysis of ideal lattice problems. In
these works, these groups are exploited independently, in ways that nevertheless
share strong similarities with each other. More recently, both groups have been
used in combination for cryptanalytic purposes [26,39]. It therefore seems natural
to turn to a unifying theory.
The Arakelov class group (denoted Pic0K) is a combination of the unit torus
T = Log K0
R
/Log(O∗K) and of the class group ClK . The exponent 0 here refers
to elements of algebraic norm 1 (i.e., modulo renormalization), while the sub-
script R indicates that we are working in the topological completion of K. By
‘a combination’ we do not exactly mean that Pic0K is a direct product; we mean
that there is a short exact sequence
0 −→ T −→ Pic0K −→ ClK −→ 0.
That is, T is (isomorphic to) a subgroup of Pic0K , and ClK is (isomorphic to) the
quotient Pic0K /T . The Arakelov class group is an abelian group which combines
an uncountable (yet compact) part T and a finite part ClK ; topologically, it
should be thought of as |ClK | many disconnected copies of the torus T .
A worst-case to average-case reduction for ideal-SVP. An important aspect of
the Arakelov Class Group for the present work is that this group has a geometric
interpretation: it can essentially be understood as the group of all ideal lattices up
to K-linear isometries. Furthermore, being equipped with a metric, it naturally
induces a notion of near-isometry. Such a notion gives a new handle to elucidate
the question of the hardness of ideal-SVP: knowing a short vector in I, and a
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near-isometry from I to J , one can deduce a short vector of J up to a small loss
induced by the distortion of the near-isometry. This suggests a strategy towards
a worst-case to average-case reduction for ideal lattices, namely randomly distort
a worst-case ideal to a random one.
However, there are two issues with this strategy: first near-isometry leaves
one stuck in a fixed class of ClK ; i.e., one is stuck in one of the potentially many
separated copies of the torus that constitute the Arakelov class group. Second,
even if |ClK | = 1, the torus might be too large, and to reach the full torus from
a given point, one may need near-isometry that are too distorted.
In the language of algebraic geometry, distortion of ideal lattices corresponds
to the ‘infinite places’ of the field K, while we can also exploit the ‘finite places’,
i.e., the prime ideals. Indeed, if a is an integral ideal of small norm and J = aI,
then J is a sublattice of I and a short vector of J is also a somewhat short vector
of I, an idea already used in [12,39].
Random walk in the Arakelov class group. The questions of whether the above
strategy for the self-reducibility of ideal-SVP works out, and with how much loss
in the approximation factor therefore boils down to the following question:
How fast does a random walk in the Arakelov class group converges to the
uniform distribution?
More specifically, this random walk has three parameters: a set P of finite places,
i.e., a set of (small) prime ideals, a length N for the discrete walk on finite places,
and finally a variance s for a continuous walk (e.g. a Gaussian) on infinite places.
The loss in approximation factor will essentially be driven by BN/n ·exp(s) where
B is the maximal algebraic norm of the prime ideals in P, and n the rank of the
number field.
Because the Arakelov class group is abelian and compact, such a study is car-
ried out by resorting to Fourier analysis: uniformity is demonstrated by showing
that all the Fourier coefficients of the distribution resulting from the random
walk tend to 0 except for the coefficient associated with the trivial character.
For discrete walks, one considers the Hecke operator acting on distributions by
making one additional random step, and shows that all its eigenvalues are sig-
nificantly smaller than 1, except for the eigenvalue associated with the trivial
character. This is merely an extension to compact groups of the spectral gap
theorem applied to the Cayley graph of a finite abelian group, as done in [22].
Our study reveals that the eigenvalues are indeed sufficiently smaller than
1, but only for low-frequency characters. But this is not so surprising: these
eigenvalues only account for the discrete part of the walk, using finite places,
which leaves discrete distributions discrete, and therefore non-uniform over a
continuous group. To reach uniformity we also need a continuous walk over the
infinite places, and taking a Gaussian continuous walk effectively clears out the
Fourier coefficients associated to high-frequency characters.
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1.3 Related Work
Relation to recent cryptanalytic works. The general approach to this result was
triggered by a heuristic observation made in [15], suggesting that the worst-case
behavior of the quantum Ideal-SVP algorithm built out of [6,11,12,16] could be
made not that far of the average-case behavior they studied experimentally. More
specifically, we do achieve the hoped generalization of the class-group mixing
theorem of [22,23] to Arakelov class groups; but we furthermore show that this
result affects all algorithms, and not only the one they studied.
We also remark that recent works [26,39] were already implicitly relying
on Arakelov theory. More specifically, the lattice given in Section 3.1 of [39]
is precisely the lattice of Picard-class relations between the appropriate set of
(degree 0) Arakelov Divisors. In fact, our theorem also implies upper bounds for
the covering radius of the those relation lattices, at least for sufficiently large
factor bases, and with more effort one may be able to eliminate Heuristic 4
from [39] or Heuristic 1 of [26].
Prior self-reduction via random walks. As already mentioned, our result shares
strong similarities with a technique introduced by Jao, Miller and Venkate-
san [22] to study the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves. Just as ideal
lattices can be seen as elements of the Arakelov class group, elliptic curves in cer-
tain families are in bijective correspondence with elements of the class group of
a quadratic imaginary number field. In [22], Jao et al. studied (discrete) random
walks in class groups, and showed that they have a rapid mixing property. They
deduced that from any elliptic curve, one can efficiently construct a random
isogeny (a group homomorphism) to a uniformly random elliptic curve, allowing
to transfer a worst case instance of the discrete logarithm problem to an aver-
age case instance. Instead of the finite class group, we studied random walks in
the infinite Arakelov class group, which led us to consequences in lattice-base
cryptography, an area seemingly unrelated to elliptic curve cryptography.
Prior self-reduction for ideal lattices. Our self-reducibility result is not the first
of its kind: in 2010, Gentry already proposed a self-reduction for an ideal lattice
problem [19], as part of his effort of basing Fully-Homomorphic Encryption on
worst-case problems [17]. Our result differs in several point:
– Our reduction does not rely on a factoring oracle, and is therefore classically
efficient; this was already advertised as an open problem in [19].
– The reduction of Gentry considers the Bounded Distance Decoding problem
(BDD) in ideal lattices rather than a short vector problem. Note that this
distinction is not significant with respect to quantum computers [40].
– The definition of average case distribution is significantly different, and we
view the one of [19] as being somewhat ad-hoc. Given that the Arakelov
class group captures exactly ideal lattices up to isometry, we consider the
uniform distribution in the Arakelov class group as a much more natural and
conceptually simpler choice.
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– The loss on the approximation factor of our reduction is much more favorable
than the one of Gentry [19]. For example, in the case of cyclotomic number
fields with prime-power conductor, Gentry’s reduction (on BDD) seems to
loose a factor at least Θ(n4.5), while our reduction (on Hermite-SVP) only
loses a factor Õ(
√
n) making a mild assumption on plus-part h+ of the class
number.
Other applications. Finally, we wish to emphasise that our rapid mixing theorem
for Arakelov class groups appears to be a versatile new tool, which has already
found applications beyond hardness proofs for ideal lattices.
One such application is the object of another work in progress. Namely, we
note that many algorithms [4,5,8] rely on finding elements a in an ideal I such
that aI−1 is easy to factor (e.g. prime, near-prime, or B-smooth). Such algo-
rithms are analyzed only heuristically, by treating aI−1 as a uniformly sampled
ideal, and applying know results on the density of prime or smooth ideals. Our
theorem allows to adjust this strategy and make the reasoning rigorous. First,
we show that if the Arakelov class of the ideal I is uniformly random, one can
rigorously analyze the probability of aI−1 being prime or smooth. Then, our
random-walk theorem allows to randomize I, while not affecting the usefulness
of the recovered element a. However, due to space constraints and thematic
distance, we chose to develop this application in another article.
As mentioned above, another potential application of random walk theorem
may be the elimination of heuristics in cryptanalysis of ideal and module
lattices [26,39].
2 Preliminaries
We denote by N, Z, Q, R the natural numbers, the integers, the rationals and the
real numbers respectively. All logarithms are in base e. For a rational number
p/q ∈ Q with p and q coprime, we let size(p/q) refer to log |p|+log |q|. We extend
this definition to vectors of rational numbers, by taking the sum of the sizes of
all the coefficients.
2.1 Number Theory
Throughout this paper, we use a fixed number field K of rank n ≥ 3 over Q,
having ring of integers OK , discriminant Δ, regulator R, class number h and
group of roots of unity μK . Minkowski’s theorem [34, pp. 261–264] states that
there exists an absolute constant c > 0 such that log |Δ| ≥ c·n. The number field
K has n field embeddings into C, which are divided in nR real embeddings and
nC conjugate pairs of complex embeddings, i.e., n = nR+2nC. These embeddings
combined yield the so-called Minkowski embedding Ψ : K → KR ⊆
⊕
σ:K↪→C C,
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Here, σ equals the conjugate embedding of σ whenever σ is a complex embedding
and it is just σ itself whenever it is a real embedding. Note that we index
the components of the vectors in KR by the embeddings of K. Embeddings
up to conjugation are called infinite places, denoted by ν. With any embedding
σ we denote by νσ the associated place; and for any place we choose a fixed
embedding σν .
Composing the Minkowski embedding by the component-wise logarithm of
the entries’ absolute values yields the logarithmic embedding, denoted by Log.
Log : K∗ → Log KR ⊆
⊕
σ:K↪→C
R, α → (log |σ(α)|)σ.
The multiplicative group of integral units O∗K under the logarithmic embedding
forms a lattice, namely the lattice ΛK = Log(O∗K) ⊆ Log KR. This so-called
logarithmic unit lattice has rank 
 = nR + nC − 1, is orthogonal to the all-one
vector (1)σ, and has covolume Vol(ΛK) =
√
n·2−nC/2 ·R, where the 2−nC/2 factor
is due to the specific embedding we use (see Lemma A.1 of the full version [7]).
We denote by H = Span(ΛK) the hyperplane of dimension 
, which can also
be defined as the subspace of Log KR orthogonal to the all-one vector (1)σ. We
denote by T = H/ΛK the hypertorus defined by the logarithmic unit lattice ΛK .
Fractional ideals of the number field K are denoted by a, b, . . ., but the sym-
bol p is generally reserved for integral prime ideals of OK . The group of fractional
ideals of K is denoted by IK. Principal ideals with generator α ∈ K∗ are usually
denoted by (α). For any integral ideal a, we define the norm N (a) of a
to be the number |OK/a|; this norm then generalizes to fractional ideals and
elements as well. The class-group of OK , denoted by Cl(OK), is the quotient of
the group IK by the subgroup of principal ideals PrincK := {(α) , α ∈ K}. For
any fractional ideal a, we denote the ideal class of a in Cl(OK) by [a].
Extra attention is paid to the cyclotomic number fields K = Q(ζm), for
which we can prove sharper results due to their high structure. These results
rely on the size of the class group h+K = |Cl(K+)| of the maximum real subfield
K+ = Q(ζm + ζ̄m) of K, which is often conjectured to be rather small [9,32]. In
this paper, we make the mild assumption that h+K ≤ (log n)n.
Extended Riemann Hypothesis. Almost all results in this paper rely heavily
on the Extended Riemann Hypothesis (in the subsequent part of this paper ab-
breviated by ERH), which refers to the Riemann Hypothesis extended to Hecke
L-functions (see [21, §5.7]). All statements that mention (ERH), such as Theorem
3.3, assume the Extended Riemann Hypothesis.
Prime Densities. In multiple parts of this paper, we need an estimate on the
number of prime ideals with bounded norm. This is achieved in the following
theorem, obtained from [2, Thm. 8.7.4].
Theorem 2.1 (ERH). Let πK(x) be the number of prime integral ideals of K
of norm ≤ x. Then, assuming the Extended Riemann Hypothesis, there exists an
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absolute constant C (i.e., independent of K and x) such that
|πK(x) − li(x)| ≤ C ·
√





ln t ∼ xlnx .
Lemma 2.2 (Sampling of prime ideals, ERH). Let a basis of OK be known
and let P = {p prime ideal of K | N (p) ≤ B} be the set of prime ideals of
norm bounded by B ≥ max((12 log Δ+8n+28)4, 3 · 1011). Then one can sample
uniformly from P in expected time O(n3 log2 B).
Proof. The sampling algorithm goes as follows. Sample an integer uniformly in
[0, B] and check if it is a prime. If it is, factor the obtained prime p in OK
and list the different prime ideal factors {p1, . . . , pk} that have norm bounded
by B. Choose one pi uniformly as random in {p1, . . . , pk} and output it with
probability k/n. Otherwise, output ‘failure’.
Let q ∈ P be arbitrary, and let N (q) = qj with q prime. Then, the prob-
ability of sampling q equals 1nB , namely
1
n times the probability of sampling
q. Therefore, the probability of sampling successfully (i.e., no failure) equals
|P|
nB ≥ 12n log B , since |P| ≥ B2 log B , by Lemma A.3 of the full version [7].
The most costly part of the algorithm is the factorization of a prime p ≤ B
in OK . This can be performed using the Kummer-Dedekind algorithm, which
essentially amounts to factoring a degree n polynomial modulo p. Using Shoup’s
algorithm [42] (which has complexity O(n2 + n log p) [44, §4.1]) yields the com-
plexity claim. 

2.2 The Arakelov Class Group








where p ranges over the set of all prime ideals of OK , and ν over the set of infinite
primes (embeddings into the complex numbers up to possible conjugation). We








with only finitely many non-zero np. We will consistently use the symbols
a,b, e, . . . for Arakelov divisors. Denoting ordp for the valuation at the prime p,
there is a canonical homomorphism






log |σν(α)| · ν.
The divisors of the form α for α ∈ K∗ are called principal divisors. Just as
the ideal class group is the group of ideals quotiented by the group of principal
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ideals, the Picard group is the group of Arakelov divisors quotiented by the group
of principal Arakelov divisors. In other words, the Picard group PicK is defined
by the following exact sequence.
0 → K∗/μK ·−→ DivK → PicK → 0.
For any Arakelov divisor a =
∑
p np · p +
∑
ν xν · ν, we denote its Arakelov
class by [a]; in the same fashion that [a] denotes the ideal class of the ideal a.
Despite the Arakelov divisor and Picard group being interesting groups, for
our purposes it is more useful to consider the degree-zero subgroups of these
groups. The degree map is defined as follows:
deg : DivK → R,
∑
p
np · p +
∑
ν
xν · ν →
∑
p






2 · xν .
The degree map sends principal divisors α to zero; therefore, the degree map
is properly defined on PicK , as well. We subsequently define the degree-zero
Arakelov divisor group Div0K = {a ∈ Div0K | deg(a) = 0} and the Arakelov class
group Pic0K = {[a] ∈ PicK | deg([a]) = 0}.
Note that by ‘forgetting’ the infinite part of a (degree-zero) Arakelov divi-




np · p +
∑
ν




has the hyperplane H ⊆ Log KR as kernel under the inclusion H → Div0K ,
(xσ)σ →
∑
ν xσν ν. This projection morphism Div
0
K → IK has the following
section that we will use often in the subsequent part of this paper.
d0 : IK → Div0K , a −→
∑
p





The groups and their relations, that are treated above, fit nicely in the dia-
gram of exact sequences given in Fig. 1, where the middle row sequence splits
with the section d0. It will be proven useful to show that the volume of the
Arakelov class group roughly follows the square root of the field discriminant.
Lemma 2.3 (Volume of Pic0K). We have Vol(Pic
0








log(|Δ|1/n) + log log(|Δ|1/n) + 1
)
Proof. The volume of the Arakelov class group follows from the above exact
sequence and the volume computation of T in Appendix A of the full version [7].
The bound on the logarithm is obtained by applying the class number formula
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Fig. 1. A commutative diagram of exact sequences.
[37, VII.§5, Cor 5.11] and Louboutin’s bound [27] on the residue of the Dedekind





















where ωK = |μK | is the number of roots of unity in K. For the bound on the
logarithm, use n log(e log |Δ|/n) = n log log(|Δ|1/n) + n. 

We let U(Pic0K) = 1Vol(Pic0K) · 1Pic0K denote the uniform distribution over the
Arakelov class group.
Fourier theory over the Arakelov class group. As the Arakelov class group Pic0K
is a compact abelian group, every function in2 L2(Pic0K) = {f : Pic0K →
C | ∫
Pic0K





with aχ ∈ C. In the proof of Theorem 3.3, we will make use of Parseval’s identity
[13, Thm. 3.4.8] in the following form.
∫
Pic0K






2 The measure on the Arakelov class group is unique up to scaling – it is the Haar
measure. By fixing the volume of Pic0K as in Lemma 2.3, we fix this scaling as well.
We use then this particular scaling of the Haar measure for the integrals over the
Arakelov class group.
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2.3 Lattices
A lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup of a real vector space. In the following, we
assume that this real vector space has dimension m and that the lattice is full-
rank, i.e., span(Λ) equals the whole real space. A lattice can be represented by a
basis (b1, · · · , bm) such that Λ = {
∑
i xibi , xi ∈ Z}. Important notions in lattice
theory are the volume Vol(Λ), which is essentially the volume of the hypertorus
span(Λ)/Λ (alternatively, Vol(Λ) is the absolute determinant of any basis of Λ);
the first minimum λ1(Λ) = minv∈Λ\{0} ‖v‖; and the last minimum λm(Λ), which
equals the minimal radius r > 0 such that {v ∈ L | ‖v‖ ≤ r} is of full rank m.
We will be interested into the following algorithmic problem over lattices.
Definition 2.4 (γ-Hermite-SVP). Given as input a basis of a rank m lat-
tice Λ, the problem γ-Hermite-SVP consists in computing a non-zero vector v
in λ such that
‖v‖ ≤ γ · Vol(Λ)1/m.
For a rank-m lattice Λ ⊂ Rm, we let Λ∗ denote its dual, that is Λ∗ = {x ∈
Rm : ∀v ∈ Λ , 〈v, x〉 ∈ Z}.
2.4 Divisors and Ideal Lattices
It will be proven useful to view both ideals and Arakelov divisors as lattices in the
real vector space KR, where KR has its (Euclidean or maximum) norm inherited
from the complex vector space it lives in. Explicitly, the Euclidean and maximum
norm of α ∈ K are respectively defined by the rules ‖α‖22 =
∑
σ |σ(α)|2 and
‖α‖∞ = maxσ |σ(α)|, where σ ranges over all embeddings K → C. By default,
‖α‖ refers to the Euclidean norm ‖α‖2.
For any ideal a of K, we define the associated lattice L(a) to be the image of
a ⊆ K under the Minkowski embedding Ψ, which is clearly a discrete subgroup
of KR. In particular, L(OK) is a lattice and we will always assume throughout
this article that we know a basis (b1, · · · , bn) of L(OK). For Arakelov divisors
a =
∑
p np · p +
∑
ν xν · ν, the associated lattice is defined as follows.
L(a) =
{










where diag denotes a diagonal matrix. Note that we have
Vol(L(a))=
√











The associated lattice L(a) of a divisor is of a special shape, which we call ideal
lattices, as in the following definition.
Definition 2.5 (Ideal lattices). An ideal lattice is an OK-module I ⊆ KR for
which holds that there exists an invertible x ∈ KR such that xI = L(a) for some
ideal a of OK . We let IdLatK denote the set of all ideal lattices.
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Note that the lattices L(a) for a ∈ IK are special cases of ideal lattices, which
we will call fractional ideal lattices. Since the Minkowski embedding is injective,
the map L(·) provides a bijection between the set of fractional ideals and the set
of fractional ideal lattices.
The set IdLatK of ideal lattices forms a group; the product of two ideal
lattices I = xL(a) and J = y L(b) is defined by the rule I · J = xy L(ab). It
is clear that L(OK) is the unit ideal lattice and x−1 L(a−1) is the inverse ideal
lattice of xL(a). The map L : Div0K → IdLatK ,a → L(a) sends an Arakelov
divisor to an ideal lattice. The image under this map is the following subgroup
of IdLatK .
IdLat0K = {xL(a) | N (a)
∏
σ
xσ = 1 and xσ > 0 for all σ}.
Definition 2.6 (Isometry of ideal lattices). For two ideal lattices L,L′ ∈
IdLat0K , we say that L and L
′ are K-isometric, denoted by L ∼ L′, when there
exists (ξσ) ∈ KR with |ξσ| = 1 such that (ξσ)σ · L = L′.
It is evident that being K-isometric is an equivalence relation on IdLat0K that
is compatible with the group operation. Denoting IsoK for the subgroup {L ∈
IdLat0K | L ∼ L(OK)} ⊂ IdLat0K , we have the following result.
Lemma 2.7 (Arakelov classes are ideal lattices up to isometries).




ν log(xσν )[ν] modulo principal divisors, we have the following exact sequence.
0 → IsoK → IdLat0K P−→ Pic0K → 0.
Proof. This is a well-known fact (e.g., [41]), but we give a proof for completeness.
It suffices to show that P is a well-defined surjective homomorphism and its ker-
nel is IsoK. In order to be well-defined, P must satisfy P (xL(a)) = P (x′ L(a′))
whenever xL(a) = x′ L(a′). Assuming the latter, we obtain x−1x′ L(OK) =
L((a′)−1a) = L(αOK), for some α ∈ K∗, as the module is a free OK-module.
This implies that (x−1x′)σ = σ(ηα) for all embeddings σ : K → C, for some





−1x′σν )[ν] = ηα; i.e., their difference is a principal divisor, meaning
that their image in Pic0K is the same.
One can check that P is a homomorphism, and its surjectivity can be proven








We finish the proof by showing that the kernel of P indeed equals IsoK.
Suppose xL(a) ∈ ker(P ), i.e., P (xL(a)) = ∑p ordp(a)[p] +
∑
ν log(xσν )[ν] =
α is a principal divisor. This means that a = αOK and x = (|σ(α)|−1)σ,






· L(OK), so xL(a) ∼ L(OK),
implying xL(a) ∈ IsoK. This shows that ker P ⊆ IsoK. The reverse inclusion
starts with the observation that xL(a) ∼ L(OK) directly implies that a = αOK
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is principal, by the fact that xL(a) is a free OK-module. So, (xσσ(α))σ ·L(OK) =
xL(αOK) = (ξσ)σ · L(OK) for some (ξσ)σ ∈ KR with |ξσ| = 1. Therefore,
|xσσ(ηα)| = |ξσ| = 1, i.e., |xσ| = |σ(ηα)|−1 for some unit η ∈ O∗K . From here
one can directly conclude that P (xL(a)) = P ((|σ(ηα)|−1)σ L(αOK)) = ηα, a
principal divisor. 

Lemma 2.8. For any ideal lattice L in IdLatK , we have
λn(L) ≤
√
n · λn(L(OK)) · Vol(L)1/n.
Moreover, it holds that λn(L(OK)) ≤
√
n · √Δ.
Proof. Write L = xL(a) and choose a shortest element xα ∈ xL(a). That means
‖xα‖ = λ1(xL(a)). Then xL(a) ⊃ xL(αOK), and therefore
λn(xL(a)) ≤ λn(xL(αOK)) ≤ ‖xα‖∞λn(L(OK)) ≤ ‖xα‖2λn(L(OK))
≤ λ1(xL(a)) · λn(L(OK)) ≤
√
n · λn(L(OK)) · Vol(xL(a))1/n
where the last inequality is Minkowski’s theorem. The bound on λn(L(OK)) is
proven using Minkowski’s second theorem (in the infinity norm) and the fact
that λ(∞)1 (L(OK)) ≥ 1. 

2.5 The Gaussian Function and Smoothing Errors
Let n be a fixed positive integer. For any parameter s > 0, we consider the
n-dimensional Gaussian function
ρ(n)s : R
n → C , x → e− π‖x‖
2
s2 ,
(where we drop the (n) whenever it is clear from the context), which is well
known to satisfy the following basic properties.
Lemma 2.9. For all s > 0, n ∈ N and x, y ∈ Rn, we have ∫





−2πi〈y,·〉dy = snρ1/s and ρs(x)2 = ρs/√2(x).
The following two results (and the variations we discuss below) will play an
important role and will be used several times in this paper: Banaszczyk’s bound,
originating from [3], and the smoothing parameter, as introduced by Micciancio














which decays super-exponentially in z (for fixed n). In particular, we have β(n)t ≤
e−t
2
for all t ≥ √n. The following formulation of Banaszczyk’s lemma is obtained
from [33, Equation (1.1)].
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Lemma 2.10 (Banaszczyk’s Bound). Whenever r/s ≥ √ n2π ,
ρs
(
(Λ + t) \ Br
) ≤ β(n)r/s · ρs(Λ) ,
where Br = Br(0) = {x ∈ Rn
∣
∣ ‖x‖2 < r}.
Definition 2.11 (Smoothing parameter). Given an ε > 0 and a lattice Λ,
the smoothing parameter ηε(Λ) is the smallest real number s > 0 such that
ρ1/s(Λ∗) ≤ ε. Here, Λ∗ is the dual lattice of Λ.
Lemma 2.12 (Smoothing Error). Let Λ ∈ Rn be a full rank lattice, and let
s ≥ ηε(Λ). Then, for any t ∈ Rn,
(1 − ε) s
n
det Λ




We have the following two useful upper bounds for full-rank n-dimensional lat-
tices Λ [31, Lemma 3.2 and 3.3]: ηε(Λ) ≤
√
log(2n(1 + 1/ε)) · λn(Λ) for all ε > 0




n · λn(Λ). The latter leads to the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 2.13. Let L be an ideal lattice in IdLatK . Let t ∈ Rn be arbitrary













Proof. By the assumption on s and by Lemma 2.8, we have s ≥ n · λn(L(OK)) ·
Vol(L)1/n ≥ √n ·λn(L) ≥ η2−n(Λ). The result follows then from Lemma 2.12. 

2.6 Gaussian Distributions and Statistical Distance
Statistical distance. For two random variables X and Y , we let SD(X,Y ) denote
their statistical distance (or total variation distance). This distance is equal to
half of the 
1-distance between the two corresponding distributions. In particular,







|P(X = s) − P(Y = s)|.
Continuous Gaussian distribution. For a real vector space H of dimension n, a
parameter s > 0 and a center c ∈ H, we write GH,s,c the continuous Gaussian
distribution over H with density function ρs(x − c)/sn for all x ∈ H. When the
center c is 0, we simplify the notation as GH,s.
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Discrete Gaussian distributions. For any lattice L ⊂ Rn, we define the discrete
Gaussian distribution over L of standard deviation s > 0 and center c ∈ Rn by
∀x ∈ L , GL,s,c = ρs(x − c)
ρs(L − c) .
When the center c is 0, we simplify the notation as GL,s.
Observe that we use almost the same notation for discrete Gaussian distri-
butions and for continuous ones. What allows us to make a distinction between
them are the indexes L or H (if the index is a lattice, then the distribution
is discrete whereas if the index is a real vector space, then the distribution is
continuous).
The following lemma states that one can sample from a distribution statis-
tically close to a discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice L (provided that
the standard deviation s is large enough).
Proposition 2.14 (Theorem 4.1 of [20]). There exists a probabilistic polyno-
mial time algorithm that takes as input a basis (b1, · · · , bn) of a lattice L ⊂ Rn,
a parameter s ≥ √n · maxi ‖bi‖ and a center c ∈ Rn and outputs a sample from
a distribution ̂GL,s,c such that SD(GL,s,c, ̂GL,s,c) ≤ 2−n.
We will refer to the algorithm mentioned in Proposition 2.14 as Klein’s algo-
rithm [25]. We note that Theorem 4.1 of [20] states the result for a statistical
distance negligible (i.e., of the form n−ω(1)), but the statement and the proof
can be easily adapted to other statistical distances.
3 Random Walk Theorem for the Arakelov Class Group
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.3, on random walks in the Arakelov class
group. Starting with a point in the hyperplane H ⊆ Div0K , sampled according to
a Gaussian distribution, we prove that multiplying this point sufficiently often by
small random prime ideals yields a random divisor that is very close to uniformly
distributed in the Arakelov class group (i.e., modulo principal divisors). The
proof of Theorem 3.3 requires various techniques, extensively treated in Sects.
3.2 to 3.6, and summarised in the following.
Hecke operators. The most important tool for proving Theorem 3.3 is that of
a Hecke operator, whose definition and properties are covered in Sect. 3.2. This
specific kind of operator acts on the space of probability distributions on Pic0K ,
and has the virtue of having the characters of Pic0K as eigenfunctions.
Eigenvalues of Hecke operators. The aim of the proof is showing that applying
this Hecke operator repeatedly on an appropriate initial distribution yields the
uniform distribution on Pic0K . The impact of consecutive applications of the
Hecke operator can be studied by considering its eigenvalues of the eigenfunctions
(which are the characters of Pic0K). Classical results from analytic number theory
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show that the eigenvalues of these characters are (in absolute value) sufficiently
smaller than 1, whenever the so-called analytic conductor of the corresponding
character is not too large. An exception is the unit character, which is fixed
under each Hecke operation. This classical result and how to apply it in our
specific setting is covered in Sect. 3.3.
The analytic conductor. The Hecke operator thus quickly ‘damps out’ all char-
acters with small analytic conductor (except the unit character). In Sect. 3.4, we
examine which quantities of a character of Pic0K define the analytic conductor. It
turns out that this analytic conductor is closely related to how the character acts
on the hypertorus defined by the log unit lattice. The higher the frequency of this
character on the hypertorus, the larger the analytic conductor. This frequency
can be measured by the norm of the uniquely associated dual log unit lattice
point of the character. In fact, we establish a bound on the analytic conductor
of a character in terms of the norm of its associated dual lattice point.
Fourier analysis on the hypertorus. To summarize, low-frequency (non-trivial)
characters on Pic0K (i.e., with small analytic conductor) are quickly damped out
by the action of the Hecke character, whereas for high-frequency characters we
do not have good guarantees on the speed at which they damp out. To resolve
this issue, we choose an initial distribution whose character decomposition has
only a negligible portion of high-frequency oscillatory characters. An initial dis-
tribution that nicely satisfies this condition is the Gaussian distribution (on the
hypertorus). To examine the exact amplitudes of the occurring characters of this
Gaussian distribution, we need Fourier analysis on this hypertorus, as covered
in Sect. 3.5.
Splitting up the character decomposition. In this last part of the proof, which
is covered in Sect. 3.6, we write the Gaussian distribution into its character de-
composition, where we separate the high-frequency characters, the low-frequency
ones and the unit character. Applying the Hecke operator often enough damps
out the low-frequency ones, and as the high-frequency characters were only neg-
ligibly present anyway, one is left with (almost only) the unit character. This
corresponds to a uniform distribution.
3.1 Main Result
Definition 3.1 (Random Walk Distribution in Div0K). We denote by
WDiv0K (B,N, s) the distribution on Div
0
K that is obtained by the following ran-
dom walk procedure.
Sample x ∈ H ⊆ log KR according to a centered Gaussian distribution with
standard deviation s. Subsequently, sample N ideals pj uniformly from the set




where x ∈ Div0K is understood via the injection H ↪→ Div0K .
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Definition 3.2 (Random Walk Distribution in Pic0K). By WPic0K (B,N, s),
we denote the distribution on the Arakelov class group obtained by sampling a
from WDiv0K (B,N, s) and taking the Arekalov class [a] ∈ Pic
0
K .
Theorem 3.3 (Random Walks in the Arakelov Class Group, ERH).
Let ε > 0 and s > 0 be any positive real numbers and let k ∈ N>0 be a pos-
itive integer. Putting s′ = min(
√
2 · s, 1/η1(Λ∗K)), there exists a bound B =
˜O(n2k[n2(log log(1/ε))2 + n2(log(1/s′))2 + (log ΔK)2]) such that for any N ≥

2 ·log(1/s′)+ 12 log(Vol(Pic0K))+log(1/ε)+1
k log n , the random walk distribution WPic0K (B,N, s)
is ε-close to uniform in L1(Pic0K), i.e.,
∥
∥








Below, we instantiate Theorem 3.3 with specific choices of ε and k that are
tailored to give an optimal approximation factor in Sect. 4. As a consequence,
the value of B in Corollary 3.4 is exponential in n. We note however that this
value could be made as small as polynomial in n and log Δ, but at the cost of a
slightly worse approximation factor for the reduction of Sect. 4.
The key difference between those two instantiations is how we deal with the
smoothing parameter of the dual log-unit lattice, η1(Λ∗K). In the general case,
we rely on works of Dobrolowski and Kessler [14,24] to lower bound the first
minimum of the primal log unit lattice. In the case of cyclotomics, we obtain a
sharper bound by resorting to the analysis of dual cyclotomic unit lattice from
Cramer et al. [11].
Corollary 3.4 (Application to General Number Fields, ERH).
Let s > 1/
, there exists a bound B = Õ(Δ1/ log n) such that for














log(Δ1/n) + log log(Δ1/n)
]
holds that the random walk distribution WPic0K (B,N, s) satisfies
SD
(





Corollary 3.5 (Application to Prime-Power Cyclotomic Number
Fields, ERH). Let K = Q(ζpk) be a prime-power cyclotomic number field
and assume h+K = Cl(K
+) ≤ (log n)n. For s = 1/ log2(n), there exists a bound
B = ˜O(n2+2 log n) such that, for N ≥ n2 log n
(
1/2 + 8 log(log(n))log n
)
, the random
walk distribution WPic0K (B,N, s) satisfies
SD
(





The proof of these corollaries can be found in the full version [7].
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3.2 Hecke Operators
A key tool to analyse random walks on Pic0K are Hecke operators, which allow
to transform a given distribution into a new distribution obtained by adding one
random step.
Definition 3.6 (The Hecke operator). Let P be a finite subset of prime
ideals of the number field K, and let Pic0K be the Arakelov class group. Then we







Lemma 3.7 (Eigenfunctions of the Hecke operator). The Hecke operator
HP : L2(Pic0K) → L2(Pic0K) has the characters χ ∈ P̂ic0K as eigenfunctions, with





Proof. We have HP(χ)(x) = 1|P|
∑









Note that HP(1Pic0K ) = 1Pic0K , for the trivial character 1Pic0K , so λ1Pic0K
= 1. For
any other character χ it is evident from the above that |λχ| ≤ 1.
3.3 Bounds on Eigenvalues of Hecke Operators
Using results fromanalytic number theory, one canprove the followingproposition.
Proposition 3.8 (Bound on the eigenvalues of the Hecke operator,
ERH). Let P be the set of all primes of K with norm bounded by B ∈ N.








where q∞(χ) is the infinite part of the analytic conductor of the character χ, as
in Definition 3.11 (cf. [21, Eq. (5.6)]).
The proof of this proposition can be found in the full version [7].
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3.4 The Analytic Conductor
In the bounds of Sect. 3.3, the infinite part of the analytic conductor q∞(χ)
of a character χ : Pic0K → C plays a large role. In this section, we show that this
infinite part of the analytic conductor is closely related to the dual logarithmic unit
lattice point 
∗ ∈ Λ∗K that is uniquely associated with the character χ|T : T → C.
The infinite part of the analytic conductor can be defined using the so-called
local parameters of the character χ ∈ P̂ic0K . To define these, we need F 0 =
{(aν)ν ∈
⊕
ν infinite Kν |
∏
ν |aν |ν = 1}, the norm-one subgroup of the product
of the completions Kν of K with respect to the infinite place ν. Characters








eivν log |aν |ν , (4)
where vν ∈ R, and uν ∈ Z or uν ∈ {0, 1} depending on whether ν is complex
or real (see [35, §3.3, Eq. 3.3.1]). In all these definitions, the absolute value | · |ν
equals | · |2
C
or | · |R depending on whether ν is complex or real.
Since there is the map ι : F 0 → Pic0K , (aν)ν −→
∑
ν log |aν |ν · ν, we must
have that χ ◦ ι is of the form described in Eq. (4) for all χ ∈ Pic0K . This leads to
the following definition.
Definition 3.9 (Local parameters of a character on Pic0K). For a char-
acter χ : Pic0K → C, the numbers kν(χ) = |uν | + ivν (for all infinite places ν)
are called the local parameters of χ, where uν and vν are the numbers appearing
in the formula of χ ◦ ι : F 0 → C in Eq. (4).
As characters on the Arakelov class group are actually very special Hecke charac-
ters3, the local parameters are very restricted. This is described in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.10. Let χ ∈ P̂ic0K and let 
∗ ∈ Λ∗K such that χ|T = χ∗ = e2πi〈
∗,·〉.
Then we have kν(χ) = 2πi
∗σν , where σν is an embedding associated with the
place ν.
Proof. As the map ι : F 0 → Pic0K only depends on the absolute values of (aν)ν ,
it is clear that uν = 0 in the decomposition of χ ◦ ι as in Eq. (4). It remains
to prove that vν = 2πi
∗σν . The units O∗K ⊆ F 0 map to one under χ ◦ ι, since
any principal divisor maps to one. Here, the inclusion O∗K → F 0 is defined by
η → (σν(η))ν , where σν is a fixed embedding associated with the infinite place ν.
This means that
χ ◦ ι(η) =
∏
ν







= 1 for all η ∈ O∗K ,
(5)
3 Hecke characters of K are characters on the idèle class group of K. As the Arakelov
class group is a specific quotient of the idèle class group [37, Ch. VI, pp. 360], the
characters on the Arakelov class group are essentially Hecke characters whose kernel
contains the kernel of the quotient map sending the idèle class group to the Arakelov
class group.
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where the last sum is over all embeddings σ : K → C, where νσ is the place
associated with the embedding σ, and where | · |C is the standard absolute value
on C. Vectors of the form (vνσ )σ satisfying Eq. (5) are precisely the vectors
(vνσ )σ ∈ 2πΛ∗K ⊆ log KR. By Definition 3.9, one directly obtains kν(χ) = 2πi
∗σν .

Definition 3.11 (The infinite part of the analytic conductor). Let χ ∈
P̂ic0K be a character with local parameters kν(χ), where ν ranges over the infinite




(3 + |kν |)
∏
ν complex
(3 + |kν |)(3 + |kν + 1|)
Remark 3.12. Above definition of the infinite part of the analytic conductor is
obtained from [21, p. 95, eq. (5.6) with s = 0], where it is described in a slightly
different form. In [21], the functional equation lacks the complex L-functions LC.
Instead, those are replaced by LR(s)LR(s + 1) = LC(s) (see [37, Ch. 7, Prop 4.3
(iv)]. This means that the local parameters κσ, κσ̄ as in [21, p. 93, eq. (5.3)] must
equal kν , kν + 1 for the embeddings {σ, σ̄} associated with the complex place ν
(cf. [21, p. 125]).
Lemma 3.13. Let q∞(χ) be the infinite part of the analytic conductor of the
character χ ∈ P̂ic0K , and let 
∗ ∈ Λ∗K be such that χ|T = χ∗ , where Λ∗K is the
dual lattice of the log-unit lattice. Then we have
q∞(χ) ≤
(
4 + 2π ‖
∗‖ /√n)n
Proof. Let |
∗| denote the vector 
∗ where all entries are replaced by their abso-
lute value. Then, by applying subsequently the triangle inequality, the inequality





















n and raising to the power n yields the claim. 

3.5 Fourier Analysis on the Hypertorus
Definition 3.14. Let H ⊆ Log KR be the hyperplane where the log unit lat-
tice ΛK = Log(O∗K) lives in. Recall the Gaussian function ρs : H → R, x →
e−π‖x‖
2/s2 . Denoting T = H/ΛK , we put ρs|T : T → R, x →
∑
∈ΛK ρs(x + 
).



















s−ρs|T (x)dx = 1, both functions s−ρs and s−ρs|T
can be seen as probability distributions on their respective domains Rm and T .
Random Self-reducibility of Ideal-SVP via Arakelov Random Walks 263
Lemma 3.15 (Fourier coefficients of the periodized Gaussian). The





where a∗ = 1Vol(T )ρ1/s(

∗), where Λ∗K is the dual lattice of the log unit lattice






= Vol(T ) · δ∗1 ,∗2 . Identifying T̂ and Λ∗K via the map
χ∗ → 
∗, taking a fundamental domain F of ΛK and spelling out the definition
of ρs|T , we obtain, for all 































Theorem 3.16 (ERH). Let P be the set of primes of K of norm at most B,






































∗)χ∗ (see Lemma 3.15), Vol(Pic0K) =
hK Vol(T ), and every χ ∈ T̂ has exactly hK extensions [13, Cor. 3.6.2] to char-










where χ′ ranges over all characters of Pic0K . Therefore, by the fact that the
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where χ′ ranges over all characters of Pic0K . By the fact that s
−ρs is a probability
distribution, we obtain that the eigenvalue of the unit character 1 = 1Pic0K
satisfies λ1 = 1. Therefore, by Parseval’s theorem (see Eq. (1)) and the fact that



























where χ′ ranges over all characters of Pic0K . In order to bound the quantity above,
we split up the sum into a part where ‖
∗‖ > r, and a part where ‖
∗‖ ≤ r. For
the former part we can namely bound the Gaussian ρ 1√
2s
(
∗) whereas for the
latter part we can bound the eigenvalues λχ′ (see Proposition 3.8). For the part
where ‖
∗‖ > r, we use the assumption √2sr > √
/(2π) to apply Banaszczyk’s




























For the part where ‖
∗‖ < r, we have, by Lemma 3.13 that q∞(χ) ≤ (4 +
2πr/
√


























Combining Eqs. (7) and (8), we obtain the result. 

Proof (of Theorem 3.3). Let 1 > ε > 0, s > 0 and k ∈ N>0 be given. As
1/s̃ = max( 1√
2s
, η1(Λ∗K)) ≥ η1(Λ∗K), the smoothing parameter of Λ∗K , we have
ρ 1√
2s
(Λ∗K)/Vol(T ) ≤ ρ1/s̃(Λ∗K)/Vol(T ) ≤ 2 · s̃−. (9)
By applying subsequently Hölder’s inequality (i.e., ‖f · 1‖1 ≤ ‖f‖2‖1‖2) and the










≤ 2Vol(Pic0K) · s̃−(c2N + β()√2rs) (10)
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 log(1/s̃) + 2 log(1/ε) + log(Vol(Pic0K))
)
,
implies 2 · Vol(Pic0K) · s̃− · β()√2rs ≤ ε2/2. Subsequently, choose5
B = Õ
(
n2k · [log(Δ)2 + n2 log(1/s̃)2 + n2 log(log(1/ε))2]) ,





, as in Theorem
3.16. Finally, taking any N ≥ /2·log(1/s̃)+log(1/ε)+ 12 log(Vol(Pic0K))+1k log n and noting
that c
1
k log n ≤ 1/e, we deduce 2Vol(Pic0K) · s̃−c2N ≤ 12ε2.
Combining above two bounds, we can bound the right-hand side of Eq. (10)
by ε2. Taking square roots gives the final result. 

4 Worst-Case to Average-Case Reduction
In this section, we give a worst-case to average-case reduction for approx-Hermite-
SVP in fractional ideal lattices. In the case of prime power cyclotomic number
fields (under the assumption that h+k ≤ (log n)n), our reduction increases the
approximation factor by a factor ˜O(
√
n). In the more general case, the approxi-
mation factor increases by a factor ˜O(n · Δ1/(2n)).
Our reduction works as follows. Given as input a fractional ideal a, we ran-
domize it using the random walk of the previous section, in order to obtain
something uniform in the Arakelov class group. More formally, we multiply a
by N prime ideals pi chosen uniformly among the prime ideals of norm smaller
than B (where N and B are the ones of Theorem 3.3). We then multiply the
resulting ideal a
∏
i pi by an element x ∈ KR sampled such that Log(x) follows a
Gaussian distribution of small standard deviation. Observe that this means that
the coordinates of x are somehow balanced and so multiplication by x does not
change the geometry of the ideal that much. Using Theorem 3.3, the obtained
ideal lattice L = xL(a · ∏i pi) has a uniform class in the Arakelov class group.
This will essentially be our average-case distribution for ideals.6
Assume now that one can efficiently find a small vector v in the randomized
ideal x · L(a · ∏i pi). Then x−1 · v is an element of L(a) (because L(a ·
∏
i bi) is
a subset of L(a)). Since x does not distort the geometry too much, this element
4 We use the bound β
()
α ≤ e−α2 for α ≥
√
.
5 In this bound on B one would expect an additional log(log(Vol(Pic0K)). But as it is
bounded by log(log(Δ)) (see Lemma 2.3), it can be put in the hidden polylogarithmic
factors.
6 One can observe that this randomization process outputs an ideal lattice instead of
a fractional ideal. This will be solved by rounding the ideal lattice to a fractional
lattice with close geometry.
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The approximation factor we get is then roughly equal to N (∏i pi)1/n ≤ BN/n.
Using the values of N and B in Corollaries 3.4 and 3.5, we obtain the claimed
upper bound on the increase of the approximation factors.
In this overview, we assumed for simplicity that the average-case distribution
is the uniform distribution over ideal lattices. In reality, however, for computa-
tional reasons, we will instead use a close, ‘rounded’, fractional version of this
uniform distribution. This is because general ideal lattices (i.e., Arakelov class
group elements) can’t be represented efficiently and uniquely on a computer. In
order to make the reduction computable, we therefore resort to computing with
fractional ideals only, which can be efficiently represented, for instance by a basis
with rational coefficients. To be clear, elements of the Arakelov class group are
thus only used theoretically and are never actually represented on a computer.
The first subsection below describes the average-case distribution we con-
sider, and gives some insight on why we have to modify slightly the simple
‘uniform in the Arakelov class group’ distribution. In the second subsection,
we show that the randomization procedure described above indeed produces an
ideal of the desired average-case distribution. Finally, we prove the reduction in
the last subsection.
4.1 The Average-Case Distribution
As mentioned above, the average-case distribution we would like to use is the one
obtained by sampling a uniformly distributed Arakelov class [a], and then consid-
ering the associated ideal lattice L (defined up to K-isometries, see Lemma 2.7).
This distribution however, suffers from the following difficulty: we don’t have a
nice way of representing ideal lattices. First of all, these lattices involve real num-
bers, which cannot be represented on a computer; but even if it was possible to
represent real numbers, we do not have a canonical way of representing an ideal
lattice. For instance, the natural representation of the ideal lattice L = xL(a) as
a pair (x,L(a)) is highly non-unique and it may leak some information on the
random walk that was performed to obtain L.
We solve both problems by introducing a specific rounding procedure, that
maps an ideal lattice to a fractional ideal lattice with almost the same geometry.
Once we have a fractional ideal lattice, we can compute the Hermite Normal
Form (HNF) of one of its bases. This provides us a unique representation of the
lattice, which can be efficiently represented by a matrix with rational coefficients.
The ideas behind the rounding procedure are the following. First, we observe
that dividing L by any element v ∈ L provides an ideal lattice v−1 · L which is
fractional. Hence, to round the ideal lattice L, it is sufficient to find an element
v ∈ L such that multiplication by v−1 does not distort too much the geometry
of L (this idea was already exploited by [19]). We find such a good v by sampling
it from a Gaussian distribution in L centered in (M,M, · · · ,M) for some M
significantly larger than the standard deviation. This choice of center ensures
that v has all its coordinates close to M , hence v and v−1 are well balanced and
so multiplication by v−1 does not distort the geometry too much. To conclude,
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Algorithm 1. Randomized function Extractς,M : IdLat0K → IK
Require: An ideal lattice L ∈ IdLat0K
Ensure: A fractional ideal lattice L(b)
1: Sample c = (cσ)σ uniformly in {(xσ)σ : |xσ| = M , ∀σ}.
2: Sample v ← GL,ς,c.
3: return L(b) = v−1 · L ⊂ KR.
we finally consider the ideal v−1L, whose geometry is close to the one of L, and
which is a fractional ideal.
In this subsection, our only goal is to describe the average-case distribution,
from a mathematical point of view. This means that none of the functions de-
scribed here needs to be efficiently computable, and none of the elements involved
needs to be efficiently representable.
Let us start by describing a randomized function Extractς,M (parameterized
by some ς > 0 and M > 0), that extracts from an Arakelov class [a] a fractional
ideal b, such that the distribution of b is independent from the representation
of [a]. We first describe the function Extractς,M from ideal lattices of norm 1 to
fractional ideals, and we will later extend it to Arakelov classes.7
Lemma 4.1. The function Extractς,M described in Algorithm 1 outputs a frac-
tional ideal lattice of the form L(b) for a fractional ideal b ⊂ K. More pre-
cisely, b is the inverse of an integral ideal and has an algebraic norm larger than
(
√
nς+M)−n with overwhelming probability (i.e., probability at least 1−2−Ω(n)).
Proof. Let us write the ideal lattice L as L = xL(c) for some fractional ideal c.
The element v is in L, so it is of the form x Ψ(w) for some w ∈ c. In particular,
there exists an (integral) ideal d such that (w) = cd. Putting everything together
we obtain that v−1L = Ψ(w)−1L(c) = L(d−1). To conclude the proof, we need
an upper-bound on the algebraic norm of d. Since L in is IdLat0K , we know
that | N (x)| ·N (c) = 1. We also know that with overwhelming probability, every
coordinate of v is smaller (in absolute value) than
√
nς + M , and so | N (v)| ≤
(
√
nς +M)n. We conclude by using the fact that | N (v)| = | N (x)| · N (c) · N (d).


Let us now show that the function Extractς,M is constant (as a probability
distribution) over K-isometric ideal lattices.
Lemma 4.2. Let L and L′ be two ideal lattices such that L ∼ L′ (i.e., there
exists (ξσ)σ ∈ KR, with |ξσ| = 1 for all σ, such that (ξσ)σ · L = L′). Then the
two probability distributions Extractς,M (L) and Extractς,M (L′) are identical.
Proof. Let ξ = (ξσ) ∈ KR be as in the lemma. Observe that the multiplication
by ξ is an isometry. This means that for any v ∈ L and c ∈ KR, the probability
7 Observe that contrary to the high level overview, the center c of the Gaussian dis-
tribution has been randomized (but it still holds that the sampled element v will be
balanced). This is needed in Lemma 4.2, to show that the Extractς,M (·) distributions
are identical when applied to K-isomorphic ideal lattices.
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that GL,ς,c outputs v is the same as the one that GL′,ς,ξc outputs ξv. In both
cases, the ideal output by the Extractς,M function will be v−1 · L = (ξv)−1 · L′.
Due to the random choice of c (uniform among {(xσ)σ : |xσ| = M for all σ}),
the distribution of ξc is the same as the one of c . We then conclude that both
final distributions must be identical. 

Since Extractς,M is constant over all classes of ideal lattices modulo IsoK =
{L ∈ IdLat0K | L ∼ L(OK)} ⊂ IdLat0K , we can view it as a randomized function
from IdLat0K / IsoK to IK. But recall that we have an isomorphism between
IdLat0K / IsoK and Pic
0
K . Using this isomorphism, we can finally define a function
Extractς,M from Pic0K to IK, such that for any ideal lattice L, it holds that
the distributions Extractς,M (L) and Extractς,M (P (L)) are identical (where P :
IdLat0K → Pic0K is the map defined in Lemma 2.7).
We now describe our average-case distribution, which we will refer to as
Dperfectς,M (parameterized by two parameters ς,M > 0):
Dperfectς,M := Extractς,M (U(Pic0K)), (11)
where U(Pic0K) is the uniform distribution over Pic0K . Once again, this is only the
mathematical definition of the distribution Dperfectς,M , and this does not provide
an efficient algorithm for sampling from this distribution (in particular because
we cannot sample from U(Pic0K)). In the next subsection, we will explain how
one can sample efficiently from a distribution statistically close to Dperfectς,M , when
the parameter ς is large enough (this is possible since the output of Dperfectς,M are
fractional ideals of bounded algebraic norm, which can be efficiently represented).
4.2 Sampling from the Average-Case Distribution
In this section, we explain how one can efficiently sample from a distribution
Dsampleς,M that is statistically close to the distribution Dperfectς,M . Let us start by
describing a tool distribution Dround, which should be efficiently samplable. In
order to use our random walk theorem, we need to be able to sample elements
x ∈ KR such that Log(x) follows a continuous Gaussian distribution of parameter
s in H = Log(K∗
R
). This distribution however cannot be sampled efficiently on
a computer, as it is a continuous distribution. The objective of the distribution
Dround is to compute efficiently a rounded version of this distribution, where the
output x lies in Ψ(K) ⊂ KR. This is formalized in the lemma below. The proof
is rather technical and is available in the full version [7].
Lemma 4.3. For any ε1, ε2 > 0, there exists a deterministic function8 Eε1 :
H → Ψ(K) such that for any y ∈ H it holds that
‖Eε1(y) · (e−yσ )σ − 1‖∞ ≤ ε1.
8 The function Eε1 plays the role of the exponential function, rounded to a near
element of K.
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Algorithm 2. Distribution Dsampleς,M,a
Require: A fractional ideal a ⊂ K and two parameters ς, M > 0.
Ensure: A fractional ideal lattice L(b) ⊂ Ψ(K).
1: Let s = 1/(log n)2 and N , B be the smallest integers satisfying the conditions
of Corollary 3.5 (if K is a prime-power cyclotomic field) or Corollary 3.4 (in the
generic case).
2: Sample p1, · · · , pN uniformly among all prime ideals of norm ≤ B.
3: Sample (xσ)σ ← Droundε1,ε2,s for ε1 = 2−n/M and ε2 = 2−n.
4: Define L ∈ IdLatK to be L = (xσ)σ · L(∏Ni=1 pi · a).
5: Sample c = (cσ)σ uniformly in {(xσ)σ : |xσ| = M , ∀σ}.
6: Let ς ′ = N (∏Ni=1 pi · a)1/n · ς and c′ = N (
∏N
i=1 pi · a)1/n · c.
7: Sample v ← ĜL,ς′,c′ .
8: return L(b) = v−1 · L ⊂ Ψ(K).
Furthermore, for any s > 0, one can sample in time polynomial in n,maxi log ‖bi‖,
s, log(1/ε1) and log(1/ε2) from a distribution Droundε1,ε2,s that is ε2 close in statistical
distance to Eε1(GH,s). Here, (b1, · · · , bn) is a known basis of L(OK).
We can now describe the distribution Dsampleς,M,a , which we will use as a sam-
plable replacement of Dperfectς,M . Observe that the distribution Dsampleς,M,a is param-
eterized by parameters ς,M > 0 (the same as for Dperfectς,M ), but also by a frac-
tional ideal a ⊂ K. We will show that whatever the choice of a is, the distribu-
tion Dsampleς,M,a is statistically close to Dperfectς,M . Looking forward, the distribution
Dsampleς,M,a will be the one obtained by randomizing the ideal a in the worst-case to
average-case reduction.
Let a ⊂ K be any fractional ideal and ς,M > 0 be someparameters. Recall that
̂GL,ς,c refers to the distribution obtained by running Klein’s Gaussian sampling
algorithm on lattice L with parameter ς and center c (see Proposition 2.14). The
distribution Dsampleς,M,a is obtained by running the following algorithm (Algorithm 2).
Theorem 4.4. Let a ⊂ K be any fractional ideal and ς ≥ 2n+1√n · Δ1/(2n) ·
λn(L(OK)). Assume we know a basis (b1, · · · , bn) of L(OK) and an LLL reduced
basis of L(a), then there exists an algorithm sampling from the distribution
Dsampleς,M,a in time polynomial in size(N (a)), log Δ, maxi log ‖bi‖, log M and log ς.
Furthermore, the statistical distance between the distributions Dsampleς,M,a and
Dperfectς,M is at most 2−cn for some absolute constant c > 0.
The proof of this theorem is available in the full version [7].
4.3 The Reduction
We can now prove our worst-case to average-case reduction, where the average-
case distribution we consider is Dperfectς,M (for some well chosen parameters ς
and M). The proof of this theorem is available in the full version [7].
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Theorem 4.5. Let ς ≥ 2n+1√n · Δ1/(2n) · λn(L(OK)) and M ≥ 2
√
nς. Assume
we have a (randomized) algorithm A and real numbers γ ≥ 1 and p > 0 such
that A solves γ-Hermite-SVP with probability at least p when given as input
L(a) ← Dperfectς,M (where the probability is taken over the choice of a and over the
randomness of A). Let T be an upper bound on the run time of A on any input.
Then there exists a randomized algorithm A′ solving γ′-Hermite-SVP in any
fractional ideal L(a) with probability at least p − n−ω(1) (where the probability is
taken over the randomness of A′), for an approximation factor









) · γ for prime power cyclotomic fields
(assuming h+K ≤ (log n)n)
˜O
(
n1−nC/n · Δ1/(2n)) · γ for arbitrary number fields.
The run time of A′ is bounded by T + poly(log Δ,maxi log ‖bi‖, size N (a),
log ς, log M), where (b1, · · · , bn) is a known basis of L(OK).
Remark 4.6. Observe that from Theorem 4.4, one can sample in time polyno-
mial in log Δ, maxi log ‖bi‖, log s and log M from a distribution Dsampleς,M,OK whose
statistical distance to Dperfectς,M is at most 2−Ω(n).
Remark 4.7. Recall from Lemma 2.8 that λn(L(OK)) ≤
√
nΔ. Hence, if one
chooses ς and M minimal (still satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.5) and if
we are given an LLL reduced basis of L(OK) (which can always be computed
from any other basis), then the run time of Algorithm A′ in Theorem 4.5 is of
the form T + poly (log Δ, size(N (a))).
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